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In this paper I aim to explore how people
make sense of their anomalous experiences 
in contemporary society. Using data collected
from unstructured interviews with six women
I consider the ways in which these
experiences are conveyed, articulated and
constructed. 
Definition and context
Anomalous experiences can be conceived as
‘uncommon experience[s]... [or encounters]
that, although… experienced by a substantial
amount of the population… [are] believed to
deviate from ordinary experiences’ (Cardeña
et al, 2000: 4). Sometimes also called
paranormal experiences, this label includes
phenomena such as hallucinations,
apparitions, out-of-body experiences, near
death experiences, hypnagogia1 and mystical
or spiritual experiences. Experients often
report dramatic or profound after-effects and
sensations such as fear, elation, wonder and
revelation. This profundity has led to them
being perceived, by some, as ‘exceptional
human experiences’ (White, 1995). However,
it is difficult to speak collectively of
anomalous experiences, as they are diverse
and wide-ranging. Irwin (1999) has
insightfully noted that ‘paranormal’ or
‘anomalous’ is often synonymous with ‘as 
yet unexplained by science’ and the diversity
of category membership reflects this.
Nonetheless, despite this diversity, it is useful
shorthand, which allows me to group a
sometimes indistinct variety of experiences
that have had amazing, profound, strange,
awe-inspiring and thought-provoking effects. 
It is important to consider the complex
relationship between anomalous experiences
and Western society. Paranormal phenomena
are a source of fascination and an enduring
part of popular culture in contemporary
society (Campbell & McIver, 1987; Cardeña et
al, 2000; Wooffitt, 1992). One example of
this is the fairly recent dramatic increase in
1 Commonly refers to visions, sounds and images that occur during the phase of consciousness between sleep and
wakefulness (Mavromatis, 1987)
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television programmes such as ‘Most
Haunted’. However, whilst these phenomena
are enjoyed as entertainment, they are not
usually afforded significance by the ‘cultural
guardians of society’ (Campbell & McIver,
1987: 44). In this sense, ‘authorised’ or
‘official’ culture is preserved, reinforced and
maintains dominance through some formal
institutions (e.g. education, political). This
authorised culture does not tolerate or lend
credence to paranormal phenomena or
anomalous experiences. Thus, anomalous
experiences are perceived to be of superficial
importance to reality2 and are not bestowed
with a significant role in official culture.
Increasingly, in secular societies, such as those
of North Western Europe, where there is 
a distinct emphasis on the external, the
material and the ‘waking conscious self’; we
learn to marginalise anything that is not of
immediate and unproblematic access to this
waking self and subsequently prioritise our
external actions (Shohet, 1989). 
This is not to suggest, however, that the
picture is unambiguous. There are alternative
views in contemporary society, and
knowledge is not merely defined by a secular
worldview. Formal or orthodox religion,
mainly Christianity (but also Buddhism,
Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism3) provide
members of Western society with access to
other worldviews that do not necessarily ‘fit’
with generally accepted, secular, official and
transmitted (both formally and informally)
knowledge regarding ‘facts’ about the world
around us. Furthermore, the rise of the ‘New
Age’ movement and alternative spirituality
(Roof, 1999) have contributed to possible
frameworks for understanding. Such terms
are used to refer to a wide range of
alternative religious/spiritual practice, where
an individual’s outlook is formed by drawing
on the numerous perspectives and array of
beliefs available (Norlander et al, 2003).
However, views or frameworks such as these
are considered unconventional as they still
contrast with secular science (and, in some
ways, orthodox religion), remain distinct from
transmitted authorised knowledge (aside
from religious education) and do not
permeate dominant intellectual
consciousness. In other words, such
frameworks are not afforded the authority to
make definitive epistemic claims or provide
wholly accepted explanations about the way
the world is. 
Sociological neglect
Anomalous experiences are studied in
psychology4, most notably parapsychology
(see Irwin, 1999; and Cardeña et al, 2000 
for a comprehensive introduction to and
overview of the area). But there has been a
reluctance to treat anomalous experiences as
legitimate subjects of study within sociology5.
However, this oversight may be too hasty.
Indeed, scientific research has invariably
sought an explanation of what it is that
‘causes’ anomalous experiences. For instance,
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2 In the West, reality is exclusively demarcated by the experience that takes place during waking hours. However, some 
recent sociological work on sleep gives us a reason to question such a conceptualisation (see Williams, 2001, 2002, 2003; 
Williams & Boden, 2004).
3 Clearly this is not an exhaustive list of formal religions practised in UK society. The point is to note that formal religions 
such as these provide an alternative to secular ideas.
4 It should be noted however, that anomalous experiences are still marginalised to a degree by mainstream psychology.
5 I am arguing here that consideration of these experiences is marginalised and dismissed by sociology, not that no 
research has been conducted in this area.
the hard-line materialist view is that
anomalous experiences and paranormal
phenomena can be explained by differing
levels of neural activity in the brain
(Blackmore, 2002). However, assessing the
‘truth’ of this claim is inconsequential to this
work (though this has been the focus of
many other paranormal or parapsychological
research projects). What is of concern is an
understanding of how people assign meaning
and significance to these experiences in a
way that prioritises their subjective realities. 
Some of the difficulty, however, may have
been in how to think sociologically about
private and hidden experiences, and how to
access such phenomena. Methods such as
‘introspection’ (James, 1890) have been used
in the past and, despite the scientific aversion
to first-person methodologies as unreliable;
introspection is currently the subject of
renewed attention (though still a contested
topic, conceptually and empirically speaking)
in the field of consciousness6. It has been
consistently argued that the most profound
of these anomalous experiences (mystical or
religious experiences) are characterised by
‘ineffability’ (James, 1902: 380), in that they
defy expression and reason. Such
experiences, it is argued, are too profound,
too private and our language is ill equipped
to capture the very sensations or quality of
the experiences. Fromm (1951) suggested
that we have forgotten how to draw on
‘symbolic language’, which used to
adequately characterise experiences such 
as these. This forgetting may be in part
attributed to the available contemporary
frameworks (outlooks/worldviews) that 
we have with which to think about such
experiences. 
I believe that the prevailing conception of
anomalous experiences as irrelevant or
peripheral to a study of society is misplaced.
Anomalous experiences are always culturally
defined (Cardeña et al, 2000); such
experiences are also simultaneously
articulated and constituted in a social
context. All experiences are reported in 
a social context, assigned meaning by
individuals and constructed by language and
discourse (Foucault, 1977). This study was
therefore concerned with how people
articulated and made sense of their
anomalous experiences.
Methodology
I interviewed six women7 about their
anomalous experiences. However, revealing
such experiences to strangers may be difficult
as they often clash with dominant, secular
and rational thought (Berman, 1981).
Therefore the interviewees were all personal
contacts and friends8, whom I was aware had
experienced some form of ‘anomalous’
experience before I interviewed them.
Although researching friends can have
drawbacks, I believe that for the purposes of
this topic it was both practical and fruitful.
Yet this may not always be the case. Cotterill
(1992) suggests that some respondents may
find it easier to talk to a stranger. I was
undoubtedly aware of this and at times I felt
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6 There are numerous and varied references for this ongoing discussion a diverse selection of which includes, Cardeña, 2004; 
Dennett, 2003; Ginsburg, 2005; Goldman, 2004; Josephson, 2001; and Vermersch, 1999.
7 This was because I found that it was women who actively expressed an interest in taking part and talking about these kinds 
of experiences with me.
8 For a breakdown of their demographics see appendix 1.
that knowing my respondents may have been
a disadvantage. Friendship is mutually defined
and there is an investment for both parties 
in aiming to maintain the presentation of a
consistent self in such interaction (Goffman,
1956) and not jeopardising the relationship.
However, fostering a sense of trust is vital
when discussing experiences such as these
and one distinct advantage with interviewing
friends is the instantaneous rapport and trust
that have been nurtured prior to the research. 
I listened carefully to how these women
spoke about their anomalous experiences
using a version of the Voice-Relational
Method (VRM) (originally developed by 
Brown & Gilligan, 1992) and certain techniques
associated with discourse analysis9, in order to
observe how language was used to relate
and construct experiences. Such techniques
included identifying key words and themes to
consider the representations and associations
made. Furthermore, I sought variations in the
text and scrutinised how conflicting ideas
were or were not reconciled (Tonkiss, 1998).
This ‘strategic borrowing’ of methods from
discourse analysis involved paying ‘close
attention to the details of talk and
storytelling’ (DeVault, 1990: 108) and
established epistemological distance from a
realist approach. Somewhat problematically,
VRM’s aim to access the respondents’ voice
has, in the past, been seen as providing
‘transparent passageways into their
experiences and selves…[and] direct access 
to their subjectivity and lived experiences’
(Mauthner & Doucet, 2003: 423). However,
Doucet & Mauthner (1998; see also
Mauthner & Doucet, 2003) have successfully
adapted VRM to ward off claims of a naïve
view of language as a window to experience,
illustrating that VRM as a method is not
essentially realist. It is this version of VRM
combined with discourse analytic techniques,
and viewing the interview ‘as a topic rather
than a resource’ (Seale, 1998: 204) that
characterised my methodology. Such a
technique enabled me to understand the way
in which respondents employ discursive
strategies to construct and (re)present
themselves and their experiences during the
interview interactions.  
The analysis10 is structured in such a way as to
illustrate the marked distinctions between
respondent’s accounts, which broadly fall
under three types. The first response type,
‘Rationalising the irrational’ was characterised
by tensions, contradictory and competing
discourses, and a sense of struggle in the
narratives of four of the women. The second
type, ‘Between rationality and religion’ still
illustrated clear tensions, but was
characterised more clearly by the presence of
a religious discourse. Finally, the third type,
‘Retreating from rationality’, demonstrated a
more competent integration of ostensibly
anomalous experiences with religion and
spirituality drawn on as resources and
productive frameworks for understanding.
Although this was only a small-scale project
there are various interesting issues that these
findings raise. The three-part spectrum of
responses indicates that there are tensions
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9 Potter & Wetherell (1987) and Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) are often associated with the development of this method.
10 The analysis was an iterative process, the emergent ideas of which were facilitated by reference to existing literature 
(e.g. Berman, 1981; Bruner, 1986; Laing, 1982). This reflexive method was interwoven into the analysis and therefore 
the research findings are articulated by wider theoretical issues present in this body of literature. 
present in the cultural resources that the
respondents drew on in order to try and
understand their experiences. It is also
possible that there is something missing from
the secular, lay scientific, rational discourse
when employed as a resource for
understanding anomalous experiences. 
Response 1: Rationalising the irrational11
The first part of the spectrum focuses on the
four narratives of CJ, Sophie, Claire and
Rebecca, who discussed anomalous
experiences such as hypnagogia, sleep
paralysis, potentially prophetic dreams and
intuitive knowing. The four respondents,
displayed confusion and difficulties in
comprehensively assimilating the ‘reality’ of
their experiences into the identities that they
constructed during the interviews. The central
ideas12 I have identified in these four
narratives point to a tension between
competing and conflicting resources that the
women use in order to try and make sense of
their experiences. The women simultaneously
draw on and distance themselves from
secular or rational (herein lay scientific)
explanations and anomalous (herein
paranormal) frameworks for these
experiences. Furthermore, they attempt to
rationalise their experiences and reflect on
the credibility or ‘reality’ of an experience,
dependent on how convincing and weighty
its evidential status is. 
All four of the respondents try to rationalise
their experiences but this process is not
straightforward. They draw on the comfort of
a rational explanation and try to reason their
experience intellectually (Polanyi, 1962),
whilst simultaneously making references 
to the subjective quality of their experience
and their feelings connected to it. Indeed, 
the sense of a struggle is consistently
communicated by the presence and
articulation of these tensions. In the first
example, Claire talks about a dream that she
had and identifies a ‘real’ event that it could
be linked with and she articulates the story in
a way that conveys a degree of significance
being afforded to this experience.
“Lying on a beach, in my dream, lying on
a beach with X and on the sand,
beautiful sunny day, gorgeous…and then
just seeing a jumbo jet go by and crash in
the sea in front of me, and it was
horrible, and then erm, that happened,
that dream was shortly before 9/11…so
that started me thinking, ‘oh, is there, is
there predictive elements to dreams?’” 
Claire
Subsequently, however, Claire dismisses the
inaccuracies of the dream’s correspondence
to exact waking events. 
“If I’m honest I don’t think I’ve ever seen
a definite link I’ve never really been
satisfied that there is…but it does sort of
set me thinking ‘I wonder’ er…but if I
look back at it now logically I don’t really
think there was” 
Claire
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11 In quotation excerpts… indicates a pause in the respondents’ speech, whilst (…) represents where I have cut and 
pasted examples from different stages of the interview.
12 Clearly I have had to be selective about these ideas, especially in terms of limited space and so their centrality is due 
to my interpretation.
Claire begins her reflections by dismissing any
‘paranormal’ explanations for this dream, i.e.
that the dream was precognitive (it contained
knowledge of something before it occurs).
Simultaneously, however, she does articulate
contemplation of the dream being
precognitive. She talks about applying logic
to her experience, yet the idea of a
precognitive dream is not an accepted or
logical component of the dominant form of
knowledge in Western society. Whether this
experience was ‘really’ precognitive is not at
stake here. What is of interest is that the
resource that Claire draws upon to
understand or explain her experience ensures
that she distrusts and discounts it (Berman,
1981; Laing, 1982). Indeed, the reliance on
dreams as prophetic is no longer part of
Western culture, whereas in previous eras it
was a trusted, even actively sought out,
resource (Van de Castle, 1971). Claire’s
articulations are illustrative of an unclear and
inconsistent position, conveyed through the
appearance of holding contradictory and
confused beliefs about these phenomena. In
drawing on the (authorised) lay scientific
discourse to frame her experience, Claire
cannot explain what happened because this
rational thought denies the existence of other
possibilities and the experiences that
accompany them (Berman, 1981; Laing,
1982). 
The other respondents articulate similar
manifestations of uncertainty. For instance, CJ
reports anomalous visions or ‘sightings’,
where she sees an object ‘out of the corner
of her eye’ when in ‘reality’ there is no-
one/nothing there. CJ communicates a belief
in ghosts – a notion she refers to as ‘common
sense’ – whilst dismissing any ghost-based or
paranormal explanation for her
‘unexplainable’ experiences, which she
prefers to rationalise.
“I like to be quite practical and quite
‘there’s a reason for this’ (…) I mean I
believe in ghosts (…) that’s kind of
common sense (…) but I wouldn’t like to
see one, and I just like to think other
people know about them, I’m sure they
happen, ok (…) so when I do see
something [anomalous sighting/vision] 
I don’t try to you know ‘oh wow, what
was it?’ I just think, I’m tired or you
know, I’ve been looking at the TV or 
it must be this, or it must be that and
then it’s forgotten about and I kind of
move on” 
CJ 
CJ lists a series of possible (rational)
explanations for her experience, conveying a
desire to actively seek a ‘normal’ explanation
for her anomalous experience. Yet this
rationalising process serves to ‘explain away’
the experience and dismisses the possibility of
attributing significance to it. Any potential
meaning is thus somewhat stifled in this
articulation. 
In contrast to CJ’s assertions about ghosts,
Sophie and Rebecca’s narratives construct a
more nuanced and complex stance in relation
to lay scientific discourse and paranormal and
religious discourses. They simultaneously
draw on and dissociate themselves from lay
scientific and ostensibly paranormal
explanations of their experiences in order to
construct their own understanding in this
context. In this example, Rebecca narrates a
‘clairvoyant’ (distant knowing) anomalous
experience when she talks about linking an
overpowering smell with an intuitive knowing
about her granddad’s death. 
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“I smelt something really horrible, like,
like something decaying, like shit, you
know, horrible, horrible, (…) but I, I mean
I was at work, so, I know, I mean maybe
if I was somewhere else you’d think ‘oh’,
but I was in an office in a clean, you
know everything’s the same, and it came,
and it lasted about five minutes or
something and I think I felt like I was
getting a headache, I felt really sick
actually. And then about, and not long
after, maybe my dad rang or something
and he sounded upset and I mean I knew
because my granddad had been ill” 
Rebecca
What frames this experience is the need 
for it to be credible, for it to be validated
(Laing, 1982). She retells the story appealing
to reason, explicitly stating that she was in a
clean office and the smell could have had no
mundane source. Constructing the story in
the most convincing and believable manner
mitigates against scepticism and challenges
that could potentially discredit her 
reported experience. Her narrative further
displays a duality between lay scientific
rationality and paranormal notions. Other
respondents explicitly recognised and
articulated this tension, 
“On one hand, I have this, I have this…
erm you know this experience that for
me is extremely credible and, and feels
real, but on the other hand I have this
culture that’s imposing on me that is,
that’s telling me that this, this is a very
irrational experience and you can’t
logically explain it through experiments
and you know, truth, you know, but…
even though I don’t believe in those
kinds of areas, part of me can’t escape
them so, erm, so I’m sort of split
between that” 
Sophie
Here Sophie articulates what appears to be a
tension in the linguistic and cultural resources
she has to understand her experiences. The
limitations of these tools have the effect of
positioning anything that falls outside of
generally accepted knowledge boundaries 
as ‘silly’ or stupid. Furthermore, conveying
complete and serious acceptance of
paranormal explanations in this context
would seem to imply a lack of intelligence
and therefore be undesirable and
embarrassing. Because individuals do not
want to be judged as ‘uneducated’, gullible
or foolish they publicly position themselves
with some distance from these views, which
do not conform to authorised versions or
explanations. To do otherwise would be to
invite ridicule.  
“It’s a bit strange and a bit embarrassing
(…) I just think… I don’t like saying these
kind of things because people just think
that you’re a bit mad you know (…) and
a lot of people wouldn’t believe you, or
may believe you but they think you’re
being a bit silly” 
Sophie 
The responses in this spectrum-type display a
duality and a sense of battling dialogues;
whereby accepted lay scientific knowledge
and experience simultaneously collide and
coexist. The contradictory notions they
articulate often seem to be tested by the
respondents, at the moment of interaction,
and the answers or words used, construct a
position that becomes tenable for that
individual within that context. Furthermore,
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these responses have mixed success in
communicating certainty, integration or
contentment about these experiences; neither
do the resources these women use come
across as comprehensive or adequate
frameworks for facilitating their
understanding. Finally, for these four
respondents any mention of religious
interpretation or connotation is notably
absent from their narratives.
Response 2: Between rationality 
and religion
With additional resources for understanding
at her disposal Jane’s interview narrative
represents an intermediate position on the
three-part spectrum of responses. Her
narrative also displays a tension between the
lay scientific and paranormal discourses
demonstrated by the four respondents in the
previous section. However, there is a
difference that distinguishes Jane’s responses
from the four previous respondents quite
significantly in that she also draws on a
religious discourse in a fragmented way to
understand her experiences. Nonetheless, this
additional resource does not result in
certitude, and Jane’s narrative conveys a
sense of struggle with competing,
contradictory explanations and the tensions
between them. Jane had M.E. for several
years and here she talks about the ‘healing’
she experienced at a religious event. She also
talks about possible episodes of hypnagogia.
Jane makes repeated references to notions of
the weird or bizarre, especially in relation to
her ‘healing’ experience. She relays the story
of her ‘healing’ to me, about how she
attended a religious event and that she came
away feeling that she had been cured. Jane’s
understanding of this experience is not
straightforward. In this extract, she refers to
her original ‘healing’ claim as ‘bizarre’.
“I did sort of talk to them [her friends –
at the time] and said ‘I don’t know
what’s going on, but I feel different, 
I think I might be healed’, or whatever
erm, which feels like a really bizarre thing
to say… erm… well, it is”
Jane
This is particularly marked by the way in
which she reports her experience. She
reconstructs the past talking about the
‘healing’ at the time it occurred. She then
displays discomfort with this interpretation
and puts some distance from this view, which
is revealed in this excerpt.
“I’m not unreligious now but, I was a lot
more into that whole scene I guess erm,
so it seemed a lot more normal to be
able to say ‘I’ve been healed by God of
my illness’, whereas now to say that to
somebody feels a bit like ‘oooh… that’s 
a bit weird’”
Jane
Jane talks about her ‘healing’ in a way that
communicates embarrassment and positions
her in accordance with accepted lay scientific
and more rational beliefs. She constructs her
former (divinely driven) ‘take’ on her
experience as illogical and inconsistent with
her current self. However, her current
construction, which has less religious
emphasis, seems to provide her with
insufficient elucidation for understanding.
Jane talks about there being no physical
proof that anything changed in her, only her
personal testimony. This aptly reflects cultural
ideals with regard to the lack of credibility
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and validity afforded to subjectivity or
personal experience versus the superiority 
of rational, logical accounts and the burden
of proof (Bruner, 1986; Laing, 1982; 
Polanyi, 1962).
“It goes back to ‘it’s not logical’ erm…
and ‘you can’t explain it’ and I don’t, I
don’t like having to tell people who don’t
know me that well or didn’t know me
then… that that’s how I got better,
because it feels like it belittles the illness,
and if I got better that way then it, I
wasn’t really ill. Erm… it’d have been a
lot easier if I’d have grown a leg or
something coz then they couldn’t argue
with it (laughing)”
Jane
However, she talks in contrasting ways about
these experiences. For instance, in talking
about her hypnagogic13 experience, she 
tries to explain it in lay scientific terms 
first – ‘I think it’s some sort of weird thing
that your brain does’ – and then draws on
paranormal possibilities.
“Because I’ve mentioned ghosts about
four times, must mean that there’s part
of me that thinks ‘ooh, is this something
like that?’… But I like to think of myself
as more intelligent than that (giggles)”
Jane
Notably, however, she distances herself from
ghosts by associating them with people who
are less intelligent than her, thereby reflecting
a dominant cultural belief, that rationality
equals intelligence (Berman, 1981). The lay
scientific discourse has a dominant part to
play in framing Jane’s experiences, but this is
tempered by concepts that are not usually
associated with science. For example at one
point she talks about her intuition and
instinctive knowing (Belenky et al, 1986). She
tells me that although she listens to this
instinct, she prefers to ‘be able to back it up
with something… and you can’t do that with
weird experiences’. These examples serve to
illustrate how Jane’s religious resource
sometimes offers her an additional resource
for understanding but that she does not
position herself firmly within religious
dimensions and draws on conflicting and
competing ideas. The characterisation of
tensions is still evident in her narrative.
Response 3: Retreating from rationality
The third response illustrates how Maisie, 
in contrast to the others, narrates her
experience drawing more extensively on
religious discourse. During the interview she
constructs a story of acceptance and
assimilation regarding her anomalous
experiences. More specifically, the religious
framework she employs offers her a structure
through which to make sense of her
experiences and integrate them into her
outlook and identity. Furthermore, she does
not display discomfort with unconventional
ideas about instances of intuitive knowing 
or her spiritual experience which she
discusses here.  
Maisie often refers to herself as an intuitive
person or as having access to a way of
knowing that is deeper and not consciously
considered. She talks about this in a generic
way, saying ‘I think there is more to people
than is available on a conscious level’, and
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she refers to herself as intuitive, describing
this in the following way,
“But I often say ‘well, I, I know this, but I
don’t know why I know it or how I know
it and I might have dreamt it but I think I
know this… fact’, and more often than
not it’s borne out, but I have no… no…
clear recall of how I obtained that
information erm and I can’t substantiate
it with any evidence”
Maisie
Maisie speaks of placing value on and
trusting in this way of knowing, in opposition
to dominant ideas in the West that tend to
sideline or ridicule such controversial ways of
knowing. This knowledge does not rely on
tangible evidence, logic or rationality but
often manifests a deep sense of subjective
conviction for an individual (Belenky et al,
1986). Despite this, Maisie incorporates the
notion of ‘fact’ and ‘evidence’ into her story
about intuition. Indeed, she goes on to
illustrate and ‘substantiate’ her story with
examples, notwithstanding her previous claim
that she cannot back up her assertions. One
such example is given below.
“Like on a course I’m doing and
somebody’ll say ‘well, why is so and so
not here’ and I’ll, just comes into my
mind a reason and I think ‘well, I don’t
know if I’ve dreamt this, I’ve not written
it down anywhere, as far as I’m aware I
can’t remember having a conversation,
but I think this is where this person is.’”
Maisie
Notably, she systematically runs through an
almost algorithmic process, where she
discards each possible rational option, one by
one. In this sense her articulation is still
entrenched within the context of a lay
scientific discourse (Berman, 1981) as she
presents her claims so that they are taken
seriously – as if to demonstrate her thinking
at the time – and therefore sound more
credible. Here, Maisie appeals to reason and
constructs her story for a potentially sceptical
response. Interestingly, and at odds with lay
scientific ideas and accepted explanations,
she talks about her intuitive ‘self’ quite
wistfully, as something she values and is at
ease with. 
“And erm… so I’m perfectly… happy
with the idea that I can pick up
information without it actually being
consciously processed… erm and I also
would like, sometimes would like to think
that there’s a kind of… collective level of
information… that if you are open to…
that dimension… and I do think it is like
a kind of dimension of, er reality, um,
existence, whatever, erm… then it’s
possible for that, for the barriers to be
permeable and that you, you know
erm… information can, can pass through
and you can have information that you
don’t consciously know where you 
got it from”
Maisie
It is the way in which Maisie’s account
conveys a comfort and integration of these
potentially controversial ideas that illustrates a
marked difference between her narrative and
the other respondents. This is perhaps in part
due to the resources that Maisie has to draw
on to understand these experiences and also
to an extent the integration of a religious
dimension into the activities in her life.
Furthermore, this distinction between Maisie
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and the other respondents may be marked by
two further possibilities, the first is the nature
of our relationship (she is my mother) and
secondly, she is of a different generation to
the other respondents. The first of these
issues means that there are very different
dynamics at work in the interaction,
compared to the other interviews, merely on
the basis of our roles for each other as
mother and daughter, but also in the
closeness that we inhabit. And the second
issue, that of age, means that Maisie may be
subject to different pressures and the desire
to communicate differently from the younger
respondents (for instance, there may be a
weaker compulsion to present a conformist
position and more scope for experimental
and controversial ideas when it comes to
constructing an understanding of 
anomalous experiences). 
Maisie’s narration regarding God and religion
is a complex tapestry, interweaving the
secular notions, references to ideas associated
with orthodox religion (Catholic) and the
language of contemporary spirituality. At
some level this reflects the very complexity
and contradictory co-existence of these ideas
in contemporary society (Besecke, 2001). She
also refers to God as a positive and spiritual
part of her journey through life. At one point
in the interview, Maisie describes an intense
‘God experience’ and communicates a sense
of significance.
“I experienced something like that 
[a connection with ‘God’], which, but it
was, something I had sought over a long
period of time and erm… and felt it really
powerfully and just sat and did not want 
to move, felt erm a peace that I hadn’t
experienced ever before and a warmth and
acceptance, and… a sense of reality other
than myself and or, another person”
Maisie
When she is talking about making sense of
this experience she switches from ‘you’ to
‘we’ as if to ground her experience in a
common or collective human experience 
that is general knowledge – she appeals 
to and talks about it as if it is a timeless
shared belief.
“Well, I think it was probably, erm… 
an insight into… something for which 
we all long, however we describe it,
which is a sense of union and a sense 
of communion and a sense of peace,
that, that… is about feeling at home
with oneself”
Maisie
Such characteristics are commonly cited in
the literature about transcendence, spirituality
or religiosity (e.g. Heelas & Woodhead, 2005;
James, 1902; Jung, 1995; Norlander et al,
2003; Underhill, 1911). As I listen to Maisie
talk about her spiritual experience I am aware
that there are longer pauses in her narrative,
she often stumbles over words, selects one
word and then replaces it with another as if
she is struggling to find suitable language.
She reflects on this during the interview,
communicating a sense of frustration and
exasperation, ‘I can’t explain it any other
way…I think perhaps I’m struggling to find
other ways of framing my experience…I think
sometimes words get in the way’. This could
be seen to be an instance of what James
(1902) termed ‘ineffability’ – that there is
something about the quality of these
experiences that is too profound to be
articulated. Equally, Fromm (1951) argued
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that words impose a logic on such
experiences that is awkward and ill fitting.
Nonetheless, Maisie did articulate her 
experiences in some way and conveyed a
sense of integration in her interview that
marks her out from the other respondents.
Might this then be pointing to a flaw in the
dominant secular or lay scientific discourse
that makes this an ineffective resource for
dealing with these kinds of anomalous
experiences? Or is just the contradictory,
coexistence of competing resources in
contemporary society?
Illuminating the ‘lack’ in rationality as a
resource: The void in rationality
The stories of these women are characterised
by their tensions. This would seem to suggest
that employing lay scientific resources for
understanding these experiences is in some
way inadequate to facilitate smooth and
uncomplicated understanding. This was
communicated by the tensions in the
respondents’ talk, which suggest further 
that lay scientific resources do not offer
explanations that resonate with subjective
experience. Furthermore, the generic
construction of these experiences in lay
scientific terms as implausible, delusional or
impossible means that these stories have to
be more believable, more credible and more
unquestionable than stories of ostensibly
‘ordinary’ experiences. Indeed, these findings
would also seem to suggest that unless the
women have alternative resources (in this
case religious/spiritual) at their disposal, and
as an accepted frame of reference in their
worldview to make sense of these
experiences, then the impression that is
communicated is one of a confused and
contradictory perspective. Whilst this
interpretation may seem ambitious and bold,
given the small number of participants, it is
equally tentative and exploratory.
In the context of Western societies generally,
the dominant mode of thought is heavily
influenced by a secular and scientific
precepts. This discourse privileges rationality,
logic, the premise of cause and effect, and
description and explanation (Bruner, 1986). 
In this sense, the scientific method and lay
scientific discourse is normatively the most
highly valued route to explanation,
understanding and knowledge. Indeed, the
concept of the paranormal is present within
contemporary Western societies but it is not 
a serious or authoritative alternative to
scientific truth or rationality; neither is
religious or spiritually derived knowledge the
dominant framework for understanding.
Laing (1982) argues that science14 seeks
rational explanations for paranormal and
anomalous phenomena or insists that they
are impossible or implausible. However, the
application of logic and rationality to
anomalous experiences seems to ‘explain
away’ what happened, leaving a gulf
between such explanations and their
subjective experience, which each respondent
constructed as real enough15. According to
some (e.g. Blackmore, 2002) science has
14 It is worth noting that there is clearly a distinction between the discipline of science and mainstream secular, lay 
scientific thought. But it is also pertinent to point out that the latter is a direct result of the former and that scientific or 
rationally pursued knowledge, rather than religious or spiritual ‘truths’, carry the most weight and act as the dominant 
‘norm’ within North West European societies. 
15 This is not to suggest, however, that all these experiences are anomalous phenomena, or that they are ‘real’, but 
that ‘something’ subjective is being experienced and articulated by the respondents and this is what is important here.
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tended not to acknowledge the subjective
(internal) side of human experience,
preferring instead to focus on the external
(objective) world or the ‘matter’ of humans.
However, the conceptual split between
internal and external is an artificial
construction. By marking a precise distinction
between ‘in here’ and ‘out there’, Descartes
cemented the cornerstone of the
technological paradigm (Berman, 1981). 
This duality is manifest not only in the way 
in which people try to understand their
experiences, but also in the way in which
they see themselves as separate from the
world, as detached. It is this imposed
detachment that, for Laing (1982) that
warrants the disavowing of experience
through a scientific paradigm. 
Lost for words
Several commentators argue that the
prominence of rational thought has meant
that vital ways with which to make sense of
our world have been lost or forgotten.
Berman (1981) has termed this a loss of
‘participating consciousness’. This outlook
was one in which humans belonged and
were connected to their world. This pre-
scientific or mediaeval worldview placed
humankind at the centre of God’s universe,
where everything had a purpose and
operated in accordance with divine intention.
Berman (1981) suggests that this loss of
connection with and holistic view of the
natural world has resulted in a repression 
of the body and the unconscious mind. 
One example of this is perhaps the loss of
frameworks such as mysticism to understand
and make sense of these kinds of
experiences, affording them a clear purpose
and meaning.
However, dominant thought has not really
perceived these changes as loss. For the most
part, the secularisation of society is seen as a
necessary part of industrial and technological
development and has been viewed as
desirable, inevitable progress; ‘as a
prerequisite of freedom… [and as] a positive
gain in maturity’ (Roszak, 1972: xxi). But the
tension between rationality and experience in
the respondents’ narratives and their general
inability to make sense of their experiences
does highlight a possible void. This is
identifiable in the way that the respondents
often struggled to find language which
represented or depicted their experiences.
James (1902) suggested that something
about the quality of such profound
experiences evades description, but perhaps 
it is also due to limited and inadequate
culturally available discourses16.
It has been proposed that the language of
symbolism previously used to convey such
things has vanished from common
knowledge (Fromm, 1951). This language
consisted of metaphorical, mythical and
analogous linguistic strategies that engaged
the emotions and the imagination. For Bruner
(1986), this language is the language of
storytelling. He contends that whilst we are
familiar with the language of science ‘we
know precious little in any formal sense
about how to make good stories’ (Bruner,
1986: 14). There is however, a tension, a
duality in these women’s narratives, as they
all draw on other resources to articulate their
16 Having said this, something is going on here – respondents and experients do articulate something about these experiences.
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experiences. They make attempts to include
ghosts, superstition and sacred notions –
which are not wholly consistent with a
secular, rational and lay scientific discourse.
The articulation of ghosts and superstition
points to an inherited culture of fascination
(currently witnessed in popular culture) with
magic, myth and legend (Laing, 1982) – or
folk resources. The resource of religious
discourse, on the other hand, is two-fold. 
Dissociation from the ‘weird’
A minority of the respondents draw on the
formal religious discourses of Christianity and
Catholicism, but there are also references to
an ‘alternative’ (in relation to formal religion)
discourse of spiritual journey and
transcendence. Within the sociology of
religion, it has been proposed that in addition
to the New Age phenomenon, there is also
the existence of a ‘reflexive spirituality’ (Roof,
1999), used as a resource for meaning and
understanding by contemporary spiritual
practitioners. Some have even claimed that
this notion of ‘reflexive spirituality’ is in
operation as a language, as a cultural
resource for expressing transcendent meaning
in society (Besecke, 2001). However, the
availability of this language may be limited 
to a minority with at least a modicum of
religious allegiance (tradition, inheritance,
upbringing), and even more generally, a
hospitable and receptive wider cultural
climate. This position attests that a more
integrated approach to religion and
rationality is possible, and though the
dominant and privileged forms of knowledge
remain ‘rational’, informed by materialist
science, this may change. Indeed this is an
issue of current debate. There are those who
believe that the death of the sacred is
unfolding in the West (e.g. Bruce, 2002).
Others consider a period of change taking
place with contemporary spirituality
spearheading a transition to a different
relationship with the sacred (e.g. Luckmann,
1967, 1990; Campbell, 1999). Finally, there
are those who remain agnostic (e.g. Heelas &
Woodhead, 2005) on the issue, suggesting
that there may be changes taking place in
society regarding our relationship with the
sacred, but the evidence that it is replacing
formal religion and creating a ‘spiritual
revolution’ is not currently convincing.
Though it may be difficult to conceptualise 
or imagine, different epochs conceptualised
their world comprising of different
fundamentals. Moreover, future generations
may see our worldview as the projection of 
a mechanistic framework onto nature, rather
than nature actually being mechanistic
(Berman, 1981). Indeed, it is ‘not merely the
case that men conceived of matter as
possessing mind in those days, but rather
that, in those days, matter did possess mind,
“actually” did so’ (Berman, 1981: 93). 
These women are thus embedded in this
current paradigm – as am I. Their discursive
constructions operate within a context that
equates rationality and reason with
intelligence (Polanyi, 1962). In many senses it
is clear that the cultural resources available
will guide our individual understanding of
these experiences. ‘For example, the concept
of a spiritual body, of discarnate spirits, of
channelling, and of reincarnation all
characterize the world views of various
spiritistic groups in Brazil’ (Targ et al, 2000:
238). Yet such ideas are clearly very different
from accepted ideas in the West. Indeed,
beliefs established on the basis of emotion,
feeling, intuition, experience or ‘sensing’ are
disavowed by the authorised culture in
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Western society (Laing, 1982). 
“To accept a belief by yielding to 
a voluntary impulse, be it my own 
or that of others placed in a position 
of authority, is felt to be a surrender 
of reason”
(Polanyi, 1962: 271) 
Even if this is something that individuals do
privately, it is not commonly admitted in
social contexts where intelligence,
intellectuality and critical thinking are highly
valued. Such admissions would invite ridicule
and lambaste17. Anomalous experiences are
therefore constructed as irrational, ‘not
normal’, ‘weird’ or ‘bizarre’18. This highlights
how powerful the concept of ‘normal’ can be
in regulating an individual’s’ public discourse
(Foucault, 1989). It also highlights the legacy
and domination of scientism – “a conception
of science that reifies and idealizes science
such that all other ways of adducing
knowledge are deemed to be poor relations”
(Watson, 1998: 209) – in Western societies
for defining experience and knowledge. 
This research raises the question of whether
there are limitations with contemporary
secular or lay scientific discourse, as a
resource for sense making of apparently
profound or exceptional human experience.
Whilst anomalous experiences remain ‘trivial’
to a study of society (and marginalized within
mainstream disciplines) any understanding of
this potential void is forfeited. This is not to
suggest in a crude sense that science is not a
valuable resource, but just that it may have
limitations in relation to the subjective 
sense of these experiences. Clearly my
conclusions here are tentative, with many
opportunities for further work in this area,
not least in the first instance, recognising 
the meaning and significance of anomalous
experiences in people’s lives. As potentially
life-changing experiences, research in this
field merits sociology’s further attention 
and consideration.
17 In this sense, such a conception may have more to do with the respondents’ demographics than any general claim – 
the respondents are predominantly white, heterosexual and mainly middle class.
18 This has links with the social construction of madness (Foucault, 1989), which for spatial reasons remain undeveloped here.
Pseudonym Claire CJ Jane
Age 31 29 30
Ethnic Origin White British White British White British
Religion Undecided Catholic Catholic
Sexuality Heterosexual Straight Straight
Social Class Middle Class Lower Middle Class Working Class
Reason Profession, education, Parents, location Parents (not 
background. university educated)
Pseudonym Maisie Rebecca Sophie
Age 54 26 26
Ethnic Origin White British White British White European
Religion Roman Catholic None None
Sexuality Heterosexual Straight Heterosexual
Social Class Middle class Middle Class Middle Class
Reason White-collar Parent’s occupation, Parent’s profession
employment, education, consumer 
reasonable education. habits.
Respondent demographics were obtained prior to every interview and the responses are
recorded verbatim. The reason column indicates the respondent’s’ reason for assigning herself 
to a particular class.
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